Armed groups along Sudan's eastern frontier: An overview and analysis

Abstract

Borderlands in the Horn of Africa have long been the focus of conflict, partly because they are ill-defined, but more because they are areas where government authority tends to be minimal. As a result, they provide a suitable environment for the development and operation of armed groups dedicated to political or criminal activities. Where these groups have a political character they are largely a response to state domination by minority groups or are the product of government efforts to destabilize or overthrow neighbouring governments.

This study examines armed groups along Sudan's eastern frontier, analysing them both in historical terms and in the context of rapidly changing governments and inter-state relations. During Sudan's first and second civil wars dissident southerners gained the support of neighbouring states. Successive national governments in turn supported armed groups opposed to the regimes in Addis Ababa and later Asmara in a pattern that has continued until the present. Given the undemocratic character of governments in the Horn, the violenceprone inter-state system they have produced, and the wide availability of small arms, the study concludes that instability and the dislocation of civilian populations will continue.

I. Introduction

This paper provides introductory information and analysis on a range of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) (1) operating along Sudan's eastern borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea. It presents an understanding of how such groups operate within the broader framework of inter-state relations in the Horn of Africa, a region that has produced a large number of OAGs and suffered high levels of violent conflict over the past five decades. For the purposes of this study the Horn of Africa is considered as constituting Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia (and its various components), and Sudan.

The focus is on armed groups from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, which are based in the eastern borderlands of Sudan, transit Sudan's eastern borderlands, or are known to have operated in Sudan. The study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the agents of political violence in the Horn, and of Sudan's relations with its eastern neighbours. It is also hoped that this study will be of use to those concerned with security and with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) issues in Sudan, since the frequently wellarmed border tribes—which often have links to Ethiopia and become caught up in the tumultuous political changes that have affected the region—are proving particularly difficult to disarm. For the most part this study focuses on the past five years but, as this research demonstrates, a much longer time frame is needed to understand the development of these groups.

In the case of some groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which has operated as a guerrilla movement along the borderlands of Ethiopia and Sudan since July 1973, there is a wealth of information and hence no need to provide additional background in this report. (2) Only the recent activities of this group in the area are discussed below. Other groups, such as the SouthSudan Defence Force (SSDF), the Eastern Front, and the White Army, have been the subject of other HSBA studies, and again will not be taken up in detail in this report. (3) In most Cases, therefore, the groups considered here are quite obscure. As a result, detailed information on their leadership, ideology, numbers of members, armaments, areas of operation, and fighting capacity is limited and less than completely reliable.

Material for this study is drawn largely from the author's knowledge, based on two decades of carrying out security-related studies in the Horn. It also draws on limited and eclectic published research, media, and Internet reports; testimony provided by experts, some of whom work in the area of intelligence for states in the region; UN sources; interviews, in a very few cases, with members of OAGs that are or were operating along the eastern frontier; and a visit to Addis Ababa on 11–22 March 2007. Time and resources were not available to conduct field border studies. In a highly politicized context where fact and rumour are often confused and there are many incentives to subvert the truth, the reliability of the information on these OAGs must be approached critically. Information on weapons sources—unless, as is frequently the case, the origin lies with the governments of the region—is even more suspect. One reason for preparing this paper, therefore, is to identify the considerable gaps in knowledge about armed groups and weapons flows in this isolated and volatile region.

The principle findings of this study are:

- The shared frontier lands of Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea and have never been under the complete control of central governments and as a result have long provided a conducive environment for criminals and rebels who often exchange or overlap these roles.

- The rebel groups operating on the frontier appeal for support from neighbouring states and in some cases are the creations of these states. Hence their activities threaten to produce inter-state conflicts.

- The National Islamic Front (NIF) attempted to undermine the governments in Asmara and Addis Ababa by supporting a range of Islamist and secular opposition groups. The Eritrean and Ethiopian governments responded by assisting the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the northern opposition under the umbrella National Democratic Alliance (NDA), as well as sending their own armies into Sudan.

- The outbreak of the Ethiopia–Eritrea war (1998–2000) led both governments to attempt reconciliation with Sudan. Ethiopia and Sudan reconciled and it appeared that both countries stopped supporting each others' armed opponents.

- Unable to mend relations with Khartoum, Asmara continued to support the NDA and in addition assisted armed groups opposed to the government in Addis Ababa. Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen in turn supported a range of political and armed groups opposed to the regime in Asmara.

- Opposition to the official results of the 2005 Ethiopian national elections led to an increase in civil disobedience and threats to launch insurgencies. While there has been some military action in western Ethiopia near the border area, to date this has not posed a threat to the regime.

- Problems in Gambella have produced a number of armed groups and the proximity of the border as well as cross-border tribal allegiances have periodically led to insecurity in adjacent areas of Sudan.

- Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005, the SPLM/A has been able to exert more control over the border area with Ethiopia and this should reduce the activities of armed groups there. - In October 2006 Eritrea mediated the end of the armed conflict in eastern Sudan, and Asmara and Khartoum also reached an agreement to end their support for one another's opponents on the frontier.

- Until the states of the region undergo a democratic transformation and develop the capacity to police their frontiers, and genuine efforts are made to empower the disenfranchised that provide the support base for rebellions, these areas will continue to be fertile grounds for the emergence of armed groups.

Endnotes

(1) The term 'Other Armed Group' arises from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which stipulates that only the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) would be allowed to persist in South Sudan after the agreement's adoption. All other armed groups were therefore mandated to demobilize or be absorbed into either the SPLA or the SAF. Despite this requirement, many armed groups remain in the region two years after the signing of the CPA.

(2) See, for example, Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism Report (2006).

(3) Previous HSBA publications can be downloaded from <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ sudan>.


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