The Next Sudanese War

The year is 2011. As the SPLA Antonov makes its second high altitude pass over the GIAD military industrial complex south of Khartoum, people run around in wild panic – nobody had warned them to dig bomb shelters. Smoke from the first stick of bombs drifts amongst the factories along with the screams of the wounded and dying. Radio Omdurman has been trumpeting the success of Khartoum's forces in quickly overrunning Renk, Melut and Bentiu (not surprising really, as so many northern forces were already there “protecting” the oil fields) but plays down the heavy losses they are taking around Malakal. The government radio station also fails to mention the speed with which SPLA forces mobilised in Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains, and joined with opposition forces from Darfur, Kordofan and the Eastern Front to pose a serious threat to the flanks of the government columns invading the south. Government propaganda is quick to blame outside intervention. Uganda and Eritrea are the more credible “usual suspects” but the USA and Israel are thrown in to garner some Arab sympathy. There are rumours of heavy fighting in Khartoum itself. Embassies report that they can hear continuous gunfire and see bodies in the streets, but a total curfew and news black-out has prevented any details from emerging.

Back to 2007. Peace has come to southern Sudan. Southerners were exhausted by the war and welcomed the peace. But even as the CPA was being signed, the mantra throughout the south was, “War is better than a bad peace”. And too many southerners, when asked now what are the benefits after two years of peace, are saying, “Well, the Antonov no longer bombs us, and there is freedom of movement, but apart from that, very little has changed.” Where is the promised peace dividend?

Already the NCP/NIF is using every means at its disposal to delay and undermine the implementation of the CPA. A number of key commissions have not yet been formed, or have been formed but have hardly ever met (and in the case of the Abyei Border Commission, has had its report rejected by the NCP). Northern forces have not yet left the south, and there are reports that in the oil fields they are actually being reinforced. SPLM ministers in the GNU have no real power or influence. National government is still run by the NCP/NIF without serious reference to SPLM. The northern security apparatus has not been dismantled. Southerners believe they are not receiving their true 50% share of the oil. The billions of dollars promised for reconstruction and development has been slow to arrive and basic services are still lacking across most of the south. The war in Darfur drags on, leading to regional instability. The census is delayed, which will cause a delay in the elections scheduled for 2008. Some excuse will be found to delay the referendum in 2011. If that fails, the referendum will be rigged. And if that too fails, and southerners manage to vote for secession, then some mechanism will be found (possibly with the connivance of members of the international community and even the AU, who don't want to see another new state in Africa) to avoid actually granting independence. “Too many agreements dishonoured”, to quote Uncle Abel Alier, and southerners are determined that this one will not be dishonoured without a fight. Both sides are preparing for war.

The third southern civil war in Sudan will be more terrible than the first two, and will have some very different characteristics.

Both the previous wars began with the government controlling the south. The liberation movements began in the bush and had to fight to control territory gradually. The third war will begin with the SPLA in control of virtually the whole south, except perhaps parts of the oil fields which are still occupied by northern security forces. Fighting will begin on the north-south border. Northern forces will invade, and may quickly capture some of the towns close to the border. However SPLA will maintain its hold on most of the south, giving it secure rear bases and an undisputed border with friendly neighbours. It will be able to reinforce its forward bases rapidly and maintain its military logistics flow. A limited war to annex the oil fields of Greater Upper Nile and the rich agricultural lands of Renk, Kordofan and Blue Nile may be all that Khartoum wants, but southerners will not rest easy while any of the south remains in northern hands. And next time round they might go the extra mile to secure a referendum for their comrades-in-arms in the contested areas too.

SPLA has vowed that it will take the third war to the north. Both previous wars were fought in the south, apart from Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile. When Kurmuk, a town which the northerners perceive as northern, was taken in 1987 and again in 1997, there was consternation throughout the north.

SPLA will have air power during the next war. “Air power” does not have to be very sophisticated. In the second civil war Khartoum found itself unable to make effective military use of its jet fighter bombers and helicopter gunships as they got shot down by ground fire too easily. In fact its air power had very little military value at all. Helicopter gunships were used in support of militias against civilians in various ethnic cleansing exercises, and the notorious Antonov bombed civilians for several years; both these activities continue in Darfur. The north theoretically has air-to-air and ground-to-air interception capability, but in the 2.4 million square kilometres which make up Sudan's air space it is likely that SPLA Antonovs and gunships will have plenty of opportunity to cause panic amongst civilians in the north.

There are 1,500 SPLA troops in Khartoum in the Joint Integrated Units. If war breaks out, they are unlikely to sit back and surrender their arms. They will be joined by SLA forces and there could be a spontaneous uprising by southerners and westerners in the displaced camps and shanty towns around the three cities. Whatever the outcome, it will be very bloody before it is put down. As the rioting following the death of Dr John Garang demonstrated, it could quickly turn into mass ethnic killing. Blood will run in the streets of the capital.

In the next war, SPLA has ready-made allies, some already mobilised and battle-hardened. The war will probably not start in the Nuba Mountains and southern Blue Nile (the late Yussuf Kuwa used to say that he did not want his area to be responsible for keeping the southerners from peace, and current leaders are likely to follow that philosophy) but these two areas have obtained nothing from the CPA and they will be eager to fight alongside the south again. There are fears that tensions in Kordofan will escalate into open conflict even now; if the southern war starts again, Khartoum may be surprised to find that many of its former Baggara allies have realised the extent to which they have been used, abused, manipulated and marginalised by Khartoum, and this time will fight alongside the south. The Eastern Front is now at peace, but who can tell whether their peace agreement will be honoured or dishonoured? In any case, if there is a general outbreak of hostilities again, they may well have little option but to join in, especially if Eritrea supports them. Darfur is a natural ally for the south. Since most of the initial fighting is likely to be on the north-south border, these allies will threaten the flanks and the rear of Khartoum's invasion force.

Both sides are preparing for war. In the two previous civil wars, the south was unprepared, and its liberation armies began from very small ad hoc forces. This time the south will begin with a large standing army and with arms and materiel which it could never have dreamed of before. The north will probably have more sophisticated weaponry and will have more of everything, but it lacks committed troops. Much of Khartoum's front line army consisted of southerners and westerners; it is by no means certain that they will do their master's bidding a third time. “Real” northerners have shown a marked reluctance to get their hands dirty in real fighting. The PDF, a mixture of local mujahidiin and reluctant conscripts, has not proved too effective as a fighting force. Much of the real fighting was done by militias, and their loyalty cannot be guaranteed in the next war. SPLA troops, on the other hand, will be fighting on their home ground to defend their own nation. Their morale will be high.

Many southerners are already convinced that there will be a third war. The only discussion is when. Will it start around the time of the referendum in 2011, or will there be some earlier trigger – perhaps the census, or elections, or militia activity, or whatever? But it is not inevitable. If there is enough realism by all stakeholders at an early enough stage, then some of the problems can be addressed. The basic problem, whether in Darfur, the south or the east, is at the centre – the domination of Sudanese political systems by a small riverain elite, currently embodied in the NCP/NIF regime, which seeks to control and marginalise the peripheries whilst also insisting on a particular cultural and religious identity for the whole of Sudan. If the international community remains in denial and the NCP/NIF regime is allowed to continue undermining the CPA, and if southerners are not allowed to exercise their right of self-determination in a free, fair and credible manner, then war there will be.